In what has been highlighted by the government as “one of the great milestones” of Ecuador’s trade diversification policy, negotiations have been technically concluded for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the United Arab Emirates. The agreement, widely regarded as the most complete tool to promote Ecuadorian exports, attracts investment and opens doors in economies with high purchasing power. The trade agreement between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates will give the South American nation preferential access to one of the Middle East’s fastest-growing and strategically located economies.

Announcement of Trade Agreement Closure Reached Between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates

The South American nation’s efforts to promote greater openness and diversification through trade policy scored a coup with the recent announcement of the technical closing of negotiations for a trade agreement between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates. Signed by President Daniel Noboa, the communication officially detailed the successful conclusion of discussions aimed at strengthening Ecuador’s external agenda, diversifying its exports, and opening new markets to Ecuadorian producers across all sectors of the economy.

Trade Agreement Signed Between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates at WGS 2026

The trade agreement between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates was announced at WGS 2026 (World Governments Summit), the Dubai forum that brings together leaders, policymakers, experts, and representatives of the private sector from around the world. The agreement was jointly announced by Ecuador’s Minister of Production, Foreign Trade and Investments, Luis Alberto Jaramillo, and his United Arab Emirates counterpart, Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi, during the event.

Framework and strategic scope of the trade agreement between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates

Geostrategically located and endowed with high purchasing power, the Middle East also represents one of the fastest-growing regions in the world and a point of convergence for global logistics and trade routes. The Emirates, therefore, occupy a gateway position to markets in the GCC region, Asia, and Africa, with exceptional connectivity and access conditions for Ecuadorian products that seek to insert themselves into these and other markets internationally.

Negotiations between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates were completed ahead of schedule

The negotiation of this new Ecuador trade agreement concluded successfully in less than a year, with both countries achieving technical closure of negotiations after several months of intense work by teams on 19 different negotiation disciplines, as follows: market access for goods; rules of origin; trade in services; investment; protection of intellectual property; government procurement; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; technical barriers to trade; and economic cooperation.

Ratification process

With the technical closing, both countries will initiate their respective internal procedures for signing and ratification according to their constitutional requirements. Once complied with, the agreement enters into force and becomes binding, beginning to generate benefits for exporters and investors, as well as consumers in both countries.

Reduction and exemptions from tariffs for Ecuador’s exports to the United Arab Emirates

With this CEPA, 75% of Ecuador’s exportable goods to the United Arab Emirates will benefit from zero percent tariffs when entering the UAE market. Added value: 98% of Ecuador’s exports under negotiation will be covered by tariff preferences from day one of the entry into force of the agreement.

Impact on Ecuadorian exports

CEPA will cover more than 4,000 Ecuadorian products, both agricultural and industrial. Fresh roses, cocoa beans, prepared tuna, copper ore and concentrates, metal waste and scrap, sawn tropical wood (including balsa, virola, and imbuía), and wood panels are just some of the Ecuadorian exports that will benefit from zero tariffs upon entry into force of the Agreement.

Facilitation for industry and growth sectors in Ecuador

The gradual tariff dismantling agreed upon by Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates will be up to ten years for certain products. This will allow productive sectors such as livestock, aquaculture, agri-food industry, manufactures, textiles, footwear, and other finished goods such as furniture, auto parts, machinery, and equipment to grow and strengthen in Ecuador before facing greater external competition. This long-term approach seeks to maximize the benefits for sectors that produce under the agreement.

Non-oil exports as leaders in Ecuador’s exports with zero tariff

Products such as shrimp, fresh roses, bananas, and frozen vegetables, among others, are part of Ecuador’s main non-oil exports. The immediate duty-free access they will have to the United Arab Emirates market as of the entry into force of the CEPA is expected to boost exports of these goods and diversify the destinations and products that Ecuador sells to the rest of the world.

Trade Promotion Ecuador – United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

The Agreement Between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates for the Promotion of Trade (CEPA, for its acronym in English) is projected to boost bilateral trade in goods substantially over the coming years. During the 2020-2024 period, Ecuador exported USD 1.368 billion to its eastern partner. If, under the Agreement, Ecuador reaches sales of up to USD 1 billion a year to the UAE market by 2030, that would represent an expansion of exports to that country by more than 60%, with more diversified exports.

Bilateral Investment Treaty Ecuador United Arab Emirates (“BIT”)

This advance complements the work being done on the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates, signed in December 2025 and currently subject to constitutional review. BIT protects investors and legal certainty, improving the rules of the game for foreign direct investment (FDI). While the CEPA facilitates exports and diversification, the BIT offers investment incentives that may stimulate interest from Emirati investors in sectors such as infrastructure, renewable energy, logistics, agribusiness, manufacturing, and others.

Patagonia once again found itself at the center of one of those debates that mix foreign investment with natural resources and decisions with high political impact. Recently, national authorities began speaking openly about an economic policy matrix that places no restrictions on the sale of lands: Patagonia is open to foreign investment. After that announcement, a businessman of Qatari origin acquired nearly 10,000 hectares with a project that includes luxury hotels and three hydroelectric plants, not to supply power to cities or villages, but exclusively for the facilities themselves.

Portrayed as an energy transition and ecodollar, this project would still be harmful enough to awaken criticism from environmental groups, neighbors, university scientists, and technicians from water and land conservation sectors. Despite their small size compared to the mega-dams built throughout Patagonia in the 20th century, their mere installation in an intact ecosystem of such high value reopened in southern Argentina an unresolved debate: Who owns water? Under what conditions can we intervene in practically virgin territories?

Why is Patagonia Important?

It is worth remembering that Patagonia’s Andean watershed basins are some of the country’s most biodiverse regions, and certainly within the Southern Cone. In those basins are temperate forests native to the place, wetlands known as mallines, unique species of flora and fauna, and rivers whose watersheds store water from rainfall, melting snow in summer, and glacier retreat: everything is connected and works together, regulating water availability, biological diversity, and territorial climates at a watershed level.

Even projects considered to have low impact, experts point out, can cause irreversible consequences when development reaches a certain point.

Changing water regimes, disturbing sediment flow or vegetation patterns can affect fish reproduction downstream, alter water availability, or disconnect wildlife migration routes, among countless other examples. In Patagonia in particular, where flora and fauna have formed and exist today with minimal human intervention and very sparse populations, sensitivity to disturbance could be even greater than in other areas of the country.

For these reasons, concern has arisen over the approval of projects merely because Patagonia is open to foreign investment, regardless of whether they meet basic requirements to ensure that ecosystems will not be altered.

In this sense, the controversy surrounding hydroelectricity is only partly about the buildings themselves. The discomfort is mainly with the type of development model that facilities such as tourist resorts, country clubs, and private lodges portend. Activity of this nature generally requires new infrastructure such as access roads, leveling of hills and slopes, systems for retaining water on flat surfaces, trenches, bridges, and sewage treatment plants. Year after year, these transformations irreversibly alter territories that until very recently were beyond the intensive real estate speculation that unfortunately already affects many places in Argentina.

National Politics Also Factor

Locally, this dispute takes place on a background painted by Argentina’s national government and its management style. Javier Milei’s administration seeks to advance quickly with deregulation policies in several areas. In Patagonia, the Executive is rescuing a project to review a law passed more than ten years ago that regulates the sale of rural properties to foreigners.

That legislation established maximum limits so that no one could acquire unlimited hectares in Argentine territory. This restrictive scenario was applied especially to lands near watersheds, border areas, and food production plots.

According to their own words, officials seek to attract investments, boost development in areas that for decades have been defined as non-productive due to scarce populations, and accelerate productive works that bring resources and activity because Patagonia is open to foreign investment. They justify reviewing limitations to defend entrepreneurship and accuse past governments of committing “capitalist suicide.”

However, voices raised in defense of those restrictions are multiple and powerful. Environmental NGOs, scientists, technical university teams, indigenous peoples, and identities rooted in territory have all shown their disagreement with dismantling the country’s remaining barriers to large-scale foreignization of land.

It is not just about land. Ownership of large rural properties in Patagonia is the doorway to controlling water resources, to mining permits, to hunting tourism, or other business involving native flora and fauna. All assets that once privatized (and possibly exported) become very difficult to monitor and regulate by the State.

Official Direction: A Point of View Worth Considering

The problem with the official discourse is that talking about encouraging investments does not seem to be accompanied by strategies to think about Patagonia in long-term scenarios. For instance, droughts are more recurrent than ever before, devastating wildfires affect forests and open new conflicts around water use each year. All are strongly linked to climate change and pressure on ecosystems.

Facilitating investments in rural land is, according to opponents to the official line, just another message that runs counter to any prevention principle or goal of public goods conservation.

Environmental impact studies are accelerated. Large projects advance as of today without consultation or participation from local communities. Flexibilization rules were announced even before discussions could begin about how the country should approach Patagonia: as a natural reserve whose care the State must guarantee, or as merchandise totally open to global markets.

This is not Just About Patagonia

Beyond specific interests in a business project located on Patagonian hectares, broader issues are at play. The transition to renewable energies, the intense pressure exerted on nature by human activity and appetite for capital dubbed “green” are impacting the debate on development models around the world.

Hydropower is touted as clean energy: true, false, or something in between depends on where, how, and for what purpose it is generated. If those same megawatts will simply provide power to a private tourist facility, can it be considered energy for the common good?

For young people who are increasingly aware of climate and environmental issues, all of the above is much more than what happens with an investor from Qatar or three hydroelectric plants in Patagonia. What is at stake is the development model Argentina will choose for decades to come: unrestricted opening of its territory or sovereignty over land, water, and biodiversity coupled with productive growth.

Government representatives stated that during this period in office, they have managed to phase-out of fuel subsidies, stabilize the exchange rate, control inflation, and reactivate the private sector.

January closed with Bolivia’s participation in the World Economic Forum in Davos and the International Economic Forum for Latin America and the Caribbean, organized by CAF in Panama. At both events, the Government showcased that the country has embarked on an accelerated economic shift and that this change is already being recognized by the main international financial institutions as part of the broader Bolivian economic reform process.

In fact, this past week in Panama, the administration of President Rodrigo Paz welcomed recent signals from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which highlighted the speed with which the first steps toward structural adjustments were executed.

The Minister of Economy, José Gabriel Espinoza, stated that the IMF had initially expected the adjustment and stabilization process to take up to two years, but Bolivia managed to implement key measures “in just 11 weeks,” which is the amount of time the Paz administration has been in office.

Espinoza participated in Davos, where he held meetings with IMF authorities, and later reinforced those discussions in Panama, where he accompanied President Rodrigo Paz at the CAF-organized forum.

“We are doing things that the Fund believed could be done in one to two years, in barely two months,” the minister said. Among these measures, he mentioned the removal of fuel subsidies, exchange rate stabilization, inflation control, and the reactivation of the private sector, all without major social unrest. These actions, he emphasized, form the backbone of the Bolivian economic reform process currently underway.

That assessment was shared in Davos by IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, who described the Bolivian government’s efforts as “impressive” and confirmed that the institution will support the process “at every stage.”

For the Executive Branch, this statement carries particular political weight, since during the 20 years of MAS rule, the IMF was excluded from the economic debate and portrayed as incompatible with the statist model applied in the country.

Re-engagement with the international community

The Paz administration interprets this support as a sign that Bolivia is beginning to emerge from the international isolation that, according to the president himself, characterized the country in recent years.

This perception was reinforced by Foreign Minister Fernando Aramayo, who was tasked with reactivating channels of engagement that, in his view, had been neglected due to the ideological approach of the previous government.

“We have brought Bolivia back to the world in this space. And a no less important aspect is the set of bilateral meetings that have taken place,” Aramayo noted.

Assessments

The absence of neighboring heads of state at the Bicentennial events in August 2025 is cited by the Executive as a symbolic example of that political and diplomatic distancing.

Against this backdrop, Davos and Panama were used as platforms to reposition the country. Espinoza summarized that journey with a phrase rich in political symbolism: “from Davos to Potosí, from Potosí to Panama,” he emphasized.

The reference to Potosí points to a key domestic decision: the return of dollars to the financial system and to depositors, a measure aimed at restoring confidence after the currency crisis.

Confidence, markets, and country risk

The Government argues that the speed of the adjustments has already begun to be reflected in financial indicators. Espinoza stated that country risk has fallen below 600 basis points, a level not seen since the onset of the so-called financial “corralito.”

Beyond the technical data, the Executive presents this as a political signal: markets are once again paying attention to Bolivia after years of distrust.

“The key word is confidence,” the minister insisted, explaining that the goal is to reduce risk perception in order to attract foreign investment and reactivate domestic investment. This renewed credibility, he added, strengthens the Bolivian economic reform process in the eyes of global investors.

In his assessment, Bolivia is becoming relevant again not only because of its natural resources—minerals, gas, and agribusiness—but also due to its strategic location at the heart of South America, with the potential to connect logistical chains between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.

More financing

Another political pillar of the official message is the redefinition of the State’s role. After a period in which the public sector came to control nearly 80% of economic activity, the Government now proposes a State that facilitates and catalyzes private investment.

Espinoza emphasized that the resources announced by CAF and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) should not be understood as traditional debt, but rather as financing aimed at public-private partnerships and strengthening the private sector.

In Panama, the minister also introduced the concept of a “country portfolio,” an approach designed to move beyond the sector-based logic of the past and integrate mining, energy, infrastructure, and agribusiness into a unified strategy to link Bolivia to global value chains.

A message to the past and the future

The political reading the Government draws from its participation in Davos and Panama is straightforward: Bolivia is seeking to distance itself from the MAS economic model and demonstrate that the country can implement deep adjustments within unprecedented timeframes.

IMF backing, emphasizing the speed of the process—11 weeks instead of two years—thus becomes one of the Executive’s main arguments to claim that the country is at a turning point.

The challenge, the Government admits, will be sustaining this pace through legislative reforms, political stability, and tangible results. The message Bolivia delivered to the world is clear: the adjustment has already begun, it has been swift, and according to the IMF, it is moving faster than expected.

Mexico registers historic investment portfolio

The Mexican investment portfolio for the current presidential term has surpassed historic highs, now standing at US$367.8 billion. While this figure represents the gross total of registered, confirmed, and validated projects in the Mexican investment portfolio, much of this capital is quickly being translated into physical investments. Currently, US$63 billion in investment commitments have opened up around the country, generating close to 238 thousand jobs.

Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard presented the aforementioned data during a 4th Plenary Meeting in San Lázaro, touching on both achievements for 2025 as well as expectations for growth and investment attraction in 2026. “The volume and composition of this portfolio reflect the commitment of the federal government to ensure that these investments are materialized and carried out in the shortest possible time,” he said.

Investment Portfolio mapped by State and locality

In addition to illustrating sheer volume, another feature that sets apart the current economic program from its predecessors is the level of detail with which projects are mapped. As stated by Ebrard, President Claudia Sheinbaum instructed the Economy portfolio to identify each project by federal entity, municipality, and locality.

“We have a portfolio mapped out by the president,” said Ebrard. “There is a portfolio that Mexico has, but that President Sheinbaum asked us for; that is, we have each investment identified by federal entity and by location. In this case, we have US$367 billion mapped out, and we are following it up so that they actually materialize, and that they are carried out in the shortest possible time, so that we accelerate them.”

The commitment to follow-up was no mere statement. Projects are currently being monitored by Ximena Escobedo, head of the Ministry of Economy’s Productive Development Unit. Escobedo meets with state governments, investors, and heads of federal agencies in charge of approving projects in order to identify and eliminate bottlenecks, fast-tracking projects already included in the Mexican investment portfolio.

Announced Investments Reach US$40 billion in 2025; US$1.3 billion in January 2026

Not only has the current Mexican investment portfolio amassed the highest number of confirmed projects to date, but it also experienced significant interest from investors during the first month of the new year. Announced investments total US$40.185 billion for the year 2025, a figure which represents public commitments made directly by companies instead of estimated commitments calculated by the government.

This interest has carried over into 2026, as Mexico recorded another US$1.3 billion in investment announcements during the first month of the year. Companies continue to favor Mexico due to macroeconomic stability, strong domestic manufacturing, and proximity to export markets.

Economy Secretary comments on companies’ decision to invest in Mexico

“In this sense, we don’t determine where they are located; they themselves announce it. Companies announce where they are going to carry out their projects, the reason why they are going to carry them out there, and what they are going to invest,” Ebrard said.

While Mexico City, Nuevo León, Jalisco, Tamaulipas, and Mexico continue to lead the country in terms of the number of projects and overall investments, the federal government is aiming to spread projects to states that did not have announcements in all of 2025. “Our challenge is that the states that did not have investment announcements have them this year,” Ebrard remarked.

Mexico protects domestic industry with import reforms

While standing up for domestic industry has long been policy in sectors such as steel and agriculture, imports of finished goods have become a cause for concern for the federal government. At the start of President Sheinbaum’s administration, taxes were imposed on goods coming from countries with which Mexico has no trade agreement, many of which originate in Asia.

However, as Economy Secretary Marcelo Ebrard points out, the incoming administration has noticed a trend in which finished goods are being imported at extremely low inventory costs, threatening to destabilize local manufacturing. The automotive industry, which represents up to one-third of Mexico’s national GDP, is of special mention alongside the steel, textile, and plastic industries.

Economy Secretary highlights strengths of Mexican Automotive Industry

“The automotive industry is very important; it represents 20% of our exports, more than 900,000 direct jobs, and until last year, Mexico was the 7th biggest automobile producer in the world,” Ebrard stated. “We were importing finished automobiles that are not produced here—we continue to import them, but now they will have to pay a tariff.”

Mexico’s investment portfolio will continue to grow if the federal government can successfully convert plans into actual investments. By following up with projects already included in the portfolio, spreading investments to include all states, and protecting domestic industry from foreign competition, Mexico will set itself up for another year of macroeconomic highs.

President Yamandú Orsi is leading an unprecedented delegation as part of the 38th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic ties between China and Uruguay, underscoring the strategic importance of the bilateral relationship.

One out of every four dollars that enter Uruguay through goods exports comes from the same destination: China. For 14 years it has been the main buyer of Uruguayan products and has been a key player in the rise in living standards the country has experienced so far in the 21st century—a process closely and directly linked to the Asian country’s demand for raw materials such as beef, dairy products (which have seen a significant slowdown since 2022), pulp, wood, and soybeans.

The “commodities boom” spread across South America, and Uruguay was no exception. During the so-called “progressive era,” the region went through a cycle of prosperity closely tied to the “Chinese miracle,” driven by a profound shift toward openness in China’s economic and social policies following the 1959–1961 famine and the implementation of reforms launched in 1979—until then, China’s Constitution prohibited foreign investment. The modernizing reform involved the creation of special economic zones, the dismantling of state agricultural communes, the privatization of companies, and even the imposition of the one-child policy during those years (abandoned in 2015).

As international trade began to open up between the 1970s and 1980s, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China offered the industrialized world an abundance of cheap labor. The “factory of the world,” while retaining authoritarian traits in its single-party system of government synonymous with the State (the Communist Party of China), lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and, after 45 uninterrupted years of economic growth at an average annual rate of 9%, eliminated extreme poverty, as announced by President Xi Jinping in 2021.

In parallel, Uruguay multiplied its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—from around US$20 billion to more than US$70 billion today—with the Asian power already consolidated as its main trading partner, a role it has held for more than a decade as the largest buyer of Uruguayan products and the second-largest supplier of goods. This transformation has placed China and Uruguay at the center of one of South America’s most stable and enduring trade relationships.

In 2025, according to the latest Uruguay XXI report, which includes free trade zones, exports to the Asian country totaled US$3.493 billion. Soybeans led the export basket to that market, followed by pulp and, in third place, beef, with shipments close to US$724 million.

“China consolidated its position as Uruguay’s main trading partner, now representing 26% of total exports, up from 24% the previous year,” the agency concluded in its latest foreign trade report.

After the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1988, during the first presidency of Julio María Sanguinetti, political and commercial ties with China grew uninterruptedly, especially during the three administrations of the Broad Front (2005–2020), and continued to do so under Luis Lacalle Pou, to the point that a Free Trade Agreement was pursued without success (a feasibility study was carried out).

A record-setting tour

Within this historical framework and the current context, the government of Yamandú Orsi—aware of China’s importance to Uruguay—is leading the largest delegation ever to travel to the Asian country: more than 150 people, including mayors, business leaders, union representatives, ministers, deputy ministers, and dozens of senior officials, with the aim of further deepening bilateral relations between China and Uruguay.

Ahead of the start of official activities, Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin said that the official visit had been scheduled to take place within the first year of government. “There is a striking presence of business leaders in the delegation. No presidential foreign visit comes close to the number of private-sector actors on this trip. That alone is already a very strong signal. This is not just a public initiative; it is public-private. The government is seeking to hold business matchmaking rounds between Chinese and Uruguayan companies in order to move forward in economic and commercial development,” the foreign minister explained, illustrating the scale of the diplomatic mission.

President Yamandú Orsi will meet with President Xi Jinping on Tuesday, February 3, 2026 —a symbolic date marking the 38th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic ties—in what will be the high point of the visit, which will run through Saturday, February 7, 2026.

Focus on innovation

With a large number of agreements set to be signed, according to official announcements, the government highlighted visits to companies and industrial plants, but placed particular emphasis on technology and innovation. The top authorities of the University of the Republic, including Rector Héctor Cancela, are part of the presidential mission that will visit Beijing and Shanghai, where agreements will be signed in biotechnology and artificial intelligence with seven universities and with the telecommunications giant Huawei.

In terms of purchases, the main products imported from China are closely linked to the technology sector. Mobile phones (Antel is one of the main importers), computers, Smart TVs, and, more recently, electric vehicles are among the products China sells most to Uruguay. In this context, Industry Minister Fernanda Cardona will remain one additional day beyond the official delegation to hold meetings with executives at BYD, a multinational known for the manufacture of electric vehicles and charging stations. Juan Salgado, president of Cutcsa, is also part of the mission, as the company advances the electrification of its bus fleet with Chinese-made units.

In 2025, imports from China exceeded US$3 billion, with electric vehicles at the forefront, according to data from the National Customs Directorate.

Business leaders consulted noted that beyond the roughly 30 protocols or agreements expected to be signed, the value of the visit also lies in strengthening personal and informal ties that often facilitate long-term cooperation.

The government also reported that, in addition to ongoing discussions on tariff improvements—at a time when Uruguay is preparing to implement the TEMU tax—the agenda includes academic exchange, cooperation in science and technology, dairy products, poultry, public broadcasting (Channel 5), the National Emergency System (Sinae), and the signing of an agreement with the Pasteur Institute related to a vaccine against ticks.

A visit by an adviser very close to Xi Jinping

In November, China’s Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang— the sixth member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and a direct adviser to Xi Jinping—visited Uruguay. During that visit, the Chinese government expressed its intention to accelerate progress on several agreements signed in 2023 under former president Luis Lacalle Pou.

For China, the difficulties in advancing an agreement lie with the regional bloc

The Uruguayan delegation’s visit takes place amid growing tension in the global trade and technology dispute between the world’s two leading powers, following an escalation of tariff and geopolitical measures promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump in response to China’s expanding global influence, particularly in Latin America.

Within Mercosur—which recently concluded a historic agreement with the European Union—member countries hold divergent positions regarding relations with both China and the United States. As a result, the possibility of advancing a free trade agreement with China, whether bilaterally or as a bloc, appears distant.

Paraguay maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan; Argentina aligns closely with the United States while preserving pragmatic ties with China; Brazil faces pressure from the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo; and, beyond the bloc’s structural asymmetries, the current Uruguayan government has shown little appetite for pushing forward a free trade deal.

China’s ambassador to Uruguay, Huang Yazhong, addressed the issue recently in an interview on Canal 10. “We are always willing to develop bilateral or multilateral free trade relations. But in this specific case, the difficulty is not in China. It is an issue that Mercosur must resolve among its member countries. China always maintains an open position,” the diplomat concluded.

Recent specialized calculations show that Peru has received around US$35 billion dollars in Chinese investment since 1992. These calculations come from a variety of sources and place China as the leading investor in Peru in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

United Nations research showed that Peru had a total FDI stock of US$138 billion dollars by the end of 2024. In contrast, American Chamber of Commerce of Peru (AmCham Peru) showed that American investment reached US$7.544 billion dollars as of 2021.

Taking both studies into consideration places the United States in fourth place for Peru’s leading foreign investors.

Projects like the Port of Chancay have been what specialists say has grabbed worldwide attention about China’s position in Peru. The port will be operated and majorly owned by Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Perú S.A., which is partially owned by Chinese State Enterprise Cosco Shipping Ports Limited (60%) and Peruvian mining company Volcan Compañía Minera (40%).

The discussion around the project’s expectations and feasibility has made it a hot topic when considering the future of foreign direct investment in Peru regarding big infrastructure projects.

Some analysts claim that this port will be considered the primary entrance to South America’s west coast. This could mean new opportunities for Brazil; a country interested in decreasing the time and resources it takes to ship its production to Asia. This discussion points to the Chinese port of Shanghai as Asia’s principal doorway.

This Chinese investment growth is taking place during an ongoing Chinese worldwide expansion phase that can be looked at as anti-thesis to the United States current policies towards Asia. During the second half of Donald Trump’s presidency, the United States took an isolationist stance when it came to Asia, showing interest in stopping Asia’s growth in this region of the world.

At least when looking at Peru, data shows the US falling behind. After analyzing previous figures, China represents close to 25% of all foreign direct investment in Peru.

How Did We Get Here?

Carlos Aquino, economist and director of the Center for Asian Studies at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (UNMSM), expressed how China was able to establish such a strong corporate presence in Peru starting from 1992, when Shougang purchased Hierro Perú.

“That was significant because at that time China had just opened its doors to the world back in 1978–1979. Hierro Perú was the first Chinese investment outside of Asia,” Aquino said.

This purchase allowed Shougang to become the number one iron producer in Peru with almost 99% of all national production.

Just two years later, China would make another large entrance when China National Petroleum Corporation, also known as CNPC, was granted concessions to several oil blocks in northern Peru. One of these blocks happened to be Block X.

Chinese investment wouldn’t start to pick up pace until after they joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This allowed China to exponentially grow its exports consisting mainly of manufactured goods. With this came an increased demand for raw materials, which China then went out and sourced from all over the world. The commodities boom starting around 2002-2003, when the price of copper and other metals started to soar, also played a key role in China’s weight in foreign direct investment in Peru.

“The largest purchase related to copper was made by Aluminum Corporation of China, also known as Chinalco, which acquired the Toromocho project located in the Junín region in 2005. Another large investment would be Las Bambas in Apurímac,” said Aquino. Las Bambas was bought from Glencore–Xstrata consortium.

“Between Toromocho and Las Bambas China represents close to 20% of Peru’s national copper production. Total investments between the two mine projects are close to US$15 billion dollars,” Aquino added.

Aquino went on to explain that until the early years of this century, China was mostly focused on acquiring and investing in Peru’s natural resources. As years went by, China started investing in infrastructure. The representative project Aquino uses is from the year 2020, when China Yangtze Power International (a subsidiary of China Three Gorges Corporation) acquired Luz del Sur.

“After that, in 2024, we saw China Southern Power Grid International, or CSGI, acquire Enel Distribution Perú for approximately US$2.9 billion dollars. The company changed names to Pluz Energía Perú after selling 83.15% of its shares,” Aquino explained.

State-Owned Enterprises

Aquino stressed that the majority of these Chinese companies, whether they invest in mining or infrastructure, are state-owned. Cosco Shipping, owner of the majority of the Port of Chancay, operates under that category as well. Aquino finished off by saying that the Chinese bank’s with operations in Peru (ICBC Ltd. and Bank of China Limited) also fall under that category.

When asked about the total amount of money that China has invested in Peru, Aquino said that it’s hard to calculate. “Las Bambas alone cost the Chinese-led consortium by MMG (Mineral Mines Group) US$6 billion. And then they invested close to US$4 billion dollars more,” Aquino stated.

Aquino finished off by saying that about three or four years ago, the Chinese ambassador to Peru stated that Chinese companies had invested over US$30 billion dollars in Peru. He also stated that there are over 200 Chinese companies with operations in Peru.

A research center based in the United States reported that from 2005 to January – June 2025, total Chinese investment in Peru amounted to US$31.8 billion dollars. Including construction.

“That tells me that maybe from 1992 to 2005, Chinese companies invested around US$3 billion dollars. So, if we reached US$31 billion by the middle of 2025. By now, we are close to US$35 billion dollars invested,” the economist concluded.

Aquino later went on to say that the United Nations, which publishes a yearly report on global foreign investment, showed that by the end of 2024, Peru had reached US$138 billion dollars of foreign investment. With that in mind, US$35 billion is around 25% or one-fourth of the total. “That makes China the country with the most investment in Peru,” Aquino concluded.

Where does the US fit in with all this?

The Economic Department of AmCham Peru recently sent a press release regarding Foreign Direct Investment in Peru. Citing data provided by ProInversión, the United States represents the fourth-largest foreign investor in Peru, representing approximately 11% of the total stock of foreign direct investment in Peru by the end of 2025.

According to the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the US is the only country with investments in all 15 sectors ProInversión maps. “The majority of this investment is in mining, representing 57% of total US investment in Peru.”

AmCham Peru went on to say that the US has investments in the financial sector, manufacturing (food production, chemical goods, electronic components), commerce, information technology, and professional services.

“Mining-wise, there are only three companies responsible for US investment. Cerro Verde (Freeport McMoRan), Yanacocha (Newmont), and Miski Mayo 75% due to a US company.”

When looking at just the inflows of investment, the United States was one of few countries that increased its share in 2024. According to ProInversión yearbook of statistics, US investment increased by US$17 million dollars in 2024. From January – November of 2025 Cerro Verde increased their investments by 8% totaling US$342 million dollars. Miski Mayo increased their investment by 75% to US$24 million dollars.

Lastly, AmCham Peru showed that as of 2021 Peru received US$7.544 billion dollars of direct investment from the United States. A 4% increase compared to last year, 2020. Although 2014 was the year with the highest amount of foreign investment in Peru at US$8.097 billion dollars. Peru has seen an exponential growth in investment since 2016.