Mexico has attracted record levels of foreign investment without stabilizing its public accounts or converting the current industrial boom into inclusive social prosperity. By the end of 2025, the country had broken the historical ceiling for capital inflows, exceeding 40.9 billion dollars. These resources have been concentrated on the relocation of supply chains. However, public debt has also increased, reaching close to 52.3% of GDP at the same time. Commercial euphoria contrasts with an ever more fragile fiscal reality that multiplies vulnerabilities as the review of the USMCA advances, scheduled for July 2026. This structural tension is central to the Mexican nearshoring boom, raising questions about its sustainability.

Nearshoring: Reactive and Dependence-Intensive, Far from Sovereignty

Investment figures are staggering, but there is still a long way to go in terms of quality. Nearshoring has not been the result of an exercise in sovereign industrial policy, but rather a reactive response to geopolitical tensions and trade tariffs from Washington. The Bank of Spain and ECLAC estimate that Mexico is the main beneficiary of trade diversion from Asia, capturing more than 72% of regional investment that has entered the nearshoring dynamic. However, the national productive structure is not escaping from the low–value–added segments that prioritize final assembly for export purposes over technological absorption.

In this way, a labor market dualism has been established that reproduces the structural gap: while there is full employment in manufacturing in the north, real wages do not keep pace with productivity growth. According to recent data, the manufacturing industry has grown 1.2% in productivity in the first half of 2025, but the sector’s average hourly wage remains at around $4.20. This “spurious competitiveness,” based on wage compression and not on innovation, forces efficiency gains to be captured practically in full by foreign corporate headquarters, severely limiting the multiplier effect on domestic consumption.

The Hidden Fiscal Crisis: Investment Without Taxation Proportionate

The fiscal conflict is the most serious and least visible conflict generated by this model. Far from an increase in revenue following the boom in investment, fiscal collection is stagnant and anchored at 14.6% of GDP according to CIEP estimates, with Mexico’s official 2025 fiscal criteria. This share is insufficient to finance the infrastructure that the industry itself is demanding. In its latest Regional Sector Outlook, BBVA México itself warns of the problem: there is industrial dynamism in regions like the north of the country, but there are still great gaps in infrastructure and access to credit that condition the potential for growth. The federal government has bet on generalized tax incentives, such as the relocation decree, which allow companies to make immediate deductions for the purchase of fixed assets, on the premise that volume activity would compensate for the lower tax burden.

Multinational corporations are adept at optimizing their global tax structure by locating profit centers in countries where they pay little or no tax while their Mexican operations are cost or assembly centers. Lower revenue leads to greater indebtedness, which in turn reduces fiscal space for complementary public investment.

The macroeconomic scenario for the year 2025, as it is closing, points to the end of the post-pandemic rebound. The IMF revised its growth forecast for Mexico downwards to a timid 1%, much lower than the dynamism of other emerging markets such as Vietnam or India. The Mexican economy is growing at two disconnected speeds, with a dynamic north integrated into the Texas value chain while the south remains static and dependent on public transfers. The current Mexican nearshoring has not been the bridge between these two geographic realities.

Infrastructure: Critical Bottleneck

The lack of complementary public investment is a critical bottleneck that threatens to neutralize most of the potential benefits that the phenomenon could have in the near future, warns México Evalúa. The programmed public physical investment of 2025 has reached a historical low of only 2.3% of GDP. This austerity in energy and logistics infrastructure is slowly eroding the country’s systemic competitiveness. The Industrial Parks Association reports saturation of power transmission capacity and water shortages in priority regions such as the Bajío and the north, which forces private firms to self-supply infrastructure costs that are assumed by the state in competitor countries.

The energy and water crises in northern Mexico are not a temporary phenomenon but a structural one. The need for cheap electricity and abundant water—two commodities that the Mexican state cannot guarantee in sufficient quantity or at competitive prices—pushes companies to self-invest in solar panels, water-capture systems, and generators, increasing operating costs. By comparison, Vietnam or other Asian countries offer comparable state-supplied infrastructure at a much lower cost.

The USMCA Review in July 2026: A Diplomatic Crossroads

This internal fragility is multiplied by the approaching USMCA review, whose renegotiation clause will be triggered in July of the coming year. Moody’s has already sounded the alarm in this regard: the mere expectation of this renegotiation is already freezing long-term investment decisions. The pressure from Washington to tighten the rules of origin, currently at 75% Regional Value Content (RVC), opens a window to the dismantling of supply chains that rely on Asian inputs.

The automotive industry, the sector most exposed to nearshoring, fears that the origin of steel, aluminum, and software will be unprecedentedly scrutinized. This could indirectly raise entry barriers and force out plants that do not have the capacity to replace Chinese suppliers in record time. If the rules are tightened without adequate transition periods, plants in Mexico could see the benefits of the tariff rate quotas canceled, falling into a situation less favorable than that of facilities located in the United States.

A specific risk is precisely the offense against the triangulation of Chinese capital. The offensive from Washington to strengthen the rules of origin also seeks to end Mexico’s use as a “back door” for Asian goods. This places Mexico in a very delicate diplomatic situation. Between the Chinese investments that Mexico has attracted with success and insistence in recent years, especially in electromobility and auto parts, and the North American preferential market, there is a border that cannot be crossed. If the rules are tightened, not only could Asian investments that operate in Mexico have to leave, but it is not certain that their replacement would come from U.S. or Canadian capital.

The Asian Challenge: Vietnam, the Silent Competitor

Global competition is not slowing down while Mexico is struggling with these diplomatic dilemmas. Vietnam and other Asian countries have gone on the offensive to capture the next relocation wave. The UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2025 shows that Vietnam is among the top five destinations for greenfield (new) projects at the global level, positioning itself well above Mexico in the case of high-tech projects relative to the size of their economies. The Harvard Growth Lab highlights in its analysis that Vietnam is taking a larger share of the U.S. market by introducing new products, while Mexico grows primarily by increasing the volume of what it traditionally exports. This qualitative difference indicates that the simple geographic advantage is being undermined by the greater productive sophistication and logistical efficiency of its Asian rivals.

Proximity to the United States—once an insurmountable advantage for Mexico—is ceasing to be so as the world logistics model is improving and value chains are increasingly operating on continental scales. If a company can manufacture in Vietnam and ship to California in a similar timeframe to Mexico, why pay higher wages and labor standards to be in a neighboring country? The traditional answer has been the USMCA, precisely the agreement that is under review.

The Mexican government’s response has been inertial so far. By trusting the gravitational force of economic integration itself, it hopes to avoid any rupture. This passivity, however, ignores the political climate shift in Washington, where industrial protectionism has become bipartisan state policy. The absence of a proactive lobbying strategy and of market diversification leaves Mexico at the mercy of the U.S. electoral cycle.

The Structural Dilemma: Reform Fiscal Policy or Accept Relative Stagnation

Mexico is at a historic crossroads as it begins to tackle the challenges of the next economic cycle. Continuing the current policy formula of unconditional tax incentives and wage compression will maintain the country in a situation of unstable equilibrium. Specialization in low–value–added manufacturing will continue to accumulate public liabilities while private profits are repatriated.

The alternative, however, is one that requires structural changes in tax policy that go far beyond inertial collection. Mexico must advance in the implementation of the OECD’s Pillar Two, a global standard that sets a minimum corporate tax rate of 15% to capture a fairer share of the income generated by Mexican nearshoring. Without this measure, the base erosion that currently allows large corporations to shift their profits to low-tax jurisdictions would persist. As the Mexican Institute of Public Accountants warns in its analysis of nearshoring challenges, the main obstacle to converting this investment into long-term sustainable development is the lack of a state policy that articulates efficient incentives with legal certainty and fiscal strength.

At the same time, unconditional tax incentives must be replaced by a selective industrial policy. Foreign investment incentives should not be automatic transfers but tied to verifiable goals, such as technology transfer, national value-chain integration, or environmental compliance. This is not protectionism; it is a more efficient use of scarce public capital in a country like Mexico that has urgent budget needs in strategic areas such as infrastructure, education, and the energy transition. Without additional resources and clear requirements on corporate behavior, fiscal space to fund these strategic areas will remain insufficient.

Without these reforms, nearshoring will be a cyclical phenomenon, subject to fluctuations in the international trade policy cycle. The review of the USMCA in July 2026 and Vietnam’s fast growth in greenfield projects are exerting long-term structural pressures that an economy with debt at 52% of GDP and low public investment (2.3% of GDP) will not be able to assimilate. The IMF’s projected growth of just 1.0% for 2025 offers no room for maneuver in the face of these simultaneous challenges. In the end, the destiny of Mexican nearshoring will depend on whether it can align the quality of investment with fiscal resilience and long-term development goals.

Paraguay registers an unprecedented year in attracting investments. According to the Central Bank of Paraguay (BCP),  investment in Paraguay reached US$10.395 billion in 2024, “a consequence of the country’s sustained macroeconomic stability over the years” and its increasingly positive reputation among global investors, according to analyst William Franco.

“The strengthening of investment in Paraguay over the past three decades has consolidated our position as one of the most competitive destinations in South America” stated Acting Minister of Industry and Commerce, Lic. Arnaldo Samaniego.

The indicator that has shown the greatest growth has been the maquila industry, with historic data: from US$443 million in 2024, investments made under the maquila regime reached US$664 million as of August 2025, and the estimate for the year would reach US$900 million.

In addition to confirming Paraguay’s attraction of new foreign and national companies, this positive trend also shows the confidence of companies already installed in the country, many of which have decided to expand production lines, modernize and expand facilities, and reinforce productive capabilities.

Continuing on this investment cycle “reveals a structural change towards a more diversified and internationally integrated economy” for Paraguay, Franco stressed. This aligns with the sustained investment in Paraguay across several sectors.

The Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) reported a total of US$931 million in net investment flows during 2024, which in 12 months is an increase of almost 15% compared to the previous year. In the long term, the contrast is even greater: if in the 1990s Paraguay received around US$100 million per year, today the average annual investment is around US$600 million. This significant leap in investment in Paraguay is associated with the country’s stable macroeconomic framework, low inflation, predictable tax system, investment-friendly regulations, and an overall business environment that encourages private capital to plan for the long term.

Another important trend in recent years has been the continuous increase in the reinvestment of profits in Paraguay, a clear signal of business confidence. Instead of repatriating capital to other countries, companies are betting on strengthening their presence in Paraguay, expanding production, and strengthening their supply chains. This behavior has a multiplier effect that strengthens the national economy, generating more jobs, facilitating technology transfer, and encouraging the development of longer-term projects.

Sectoral Highlights

The MIC, citing BCP data, underscored the productive sectors that concentrate the largest share of investment in Paraguay. The commerce sector represents around 19% of total investment, driven by its role in supplying the domestic market and by the growing presence of international companies that choose Paraguay as a regional distribution center.

The financial services sector, with about 16%, continues to solidify itself as one of the central pillars of national growth. The development of this sector is a reflection of the solidity of Paraguay’s banking system, its progressive integration with international financial circuits, and its capacity to support both national and foreign businesses in their growth plans.

Agribusiness, a historic engine of the country’s economy, continues to lead in investment attraction. The soybean value chain stands out in crushing activity, export of vegetable oil, and specialized logistics, supported by the availability of raw materials, competitiveness in production costs, and a strong export tradition. The meat sector, which includes bovine, pork, and poultry, also continues to attract capital thanks to greater insertion in new international markets and the respect for strict sanitary standards. Paraguay’s advances in livestock traceability, animal health, and processing infrastructure have reinforced its international competitiveness.

Investment in Paraguay in transportation and logistics, meanwhile, is also a sector with accelerated growth and diversification, boosted by new ports, storage centers, cold chain, and multipurpose terminals. In addition to improving the performance of Paraguay’s export routes, they also generate value to national production and cut operational clogs, a determining factor for a landlocked country that is strongly dependent on river and road corridors.

Distribution of Investments in Paraguay by Country

The profile of Paraguay’s investment inflows shows that capital mainly comes from strategic partner countries. Brazil appears as the first investor, with around 15%, followed by the United States and the Netherlands, both with about 10%. Uruguay and Spain complete the list, with shares between 6% and 7% each. These five countries together account for more than half of Paraguay’s accumulated capital, a clear reflection of strong ties with the country’s regional neighbors and traditional trade partners.

Territorial Destination

The distribution of investment in Paraguay also shows a spread in several regions. Alto Paraná continues to consolidate itself as one of the country’s most active industrial poles, with a solid ecosystem of maquila companies, electronics, auto parts, and logistics, strongly linked to Brazil. In Itapúa there is a combination of dynamic agribusiness and manufacturing poles, as well as infrastructure of relevance such as airport and port logistics.

Chaco, dynamized with advances in the Bioceanic Corridor, is being reactivated by livestock operations, agro-exports, and large logistics installations. Asunción and Central continue to be the centers of services, technology, and commerce. Concepción, meanwhile, experiences a renewed dynamism with the construction of large-scale projects such as the building of a new pulp mill that is expected to generate significant employment and multiplier effects in that northern region.

Investment Announcements in 2025

In 2025, the coming months are marked by a series of relevant investment announcements. A variety of economic missions are carried out from abroad under the coordination of the technical teams of the MIC, which are complemented by tours promoted by the Presidency of the Republic to present and reinforce the country’s image abroad. In August, REDIEX launches a 250-page guide for investments, in which Paraguay ranks first in the Economic Climate Indicator (163 points), ahead of Uruguay (127 points), and in which Paraguay presents one of the most competitive electricity rates in the region at US$0.04 per kWh. In addition, within the identified priority sectors, forestry stands out for export potential and its long-term sustainability vision.

Some of the most important announcements include:

US$300 million from Group C for pork production and processing.

US$135 million from JBS (Brazil) for expansion of operations, which consolidates Paraguay’s sanitary and logistical competitiveness.

More than US$40 million by Savilcon Group.

Record Performance in Law 60/90 and the Maquila Regime

After almost three decades, Paraguay put an end to updating both Law 60/90 and the Maquila Law, making them more competitive and in line with the challenges of today’s globalized world. The maquila regime maintains its 1% value-added tax on exports, with the additional advantage that it incorporates a refund of 0.5% VAT on services exports.

The updated Law 60/90 further increases incentives for projects that require greater intensity of machinery, technology, and higher levels of innovation. Paraguay approved, in 2025, the Law for the Assembly of High-Tech Goods, aimed at promoting and incentivizing investments in productive activities specializing in electronics, telecommunications, and smart devices, activities considered, so far, too specialized for Paraguay.

These reforms have not been in vain. Investment in Paraguay in the two regimes exceeded US$664 million as of August 2025, a record in absolute terms, when compared to the US$443 million received in 2024 and the US$353 million of 2023. Projections estimate that investment could reach US$900 million by the end of this year, and also add more than 4,420 new jobs to those that have already been generated in the last few years. As these new policies mature, they are expected to stimulate even greater investment in Paraguay in high-tech, export-oriented, and value-added sectors.

A New Era for Brazil’s Space Program

After years of limited investment and the growing presence of China, the South American giant will experience a historic day on December 17. If conditions allow, the launch of the HANBIT-Nano rocket—developed by the South Korean company Innospace—is scheduled for December 17 from the Alcântara Launch Center (CLA) in Maranhão, northeastern Brazil. This is a historic event, as it will be the first Brazilian commercial orbital launch in the nation’s space history.

Until now, Brazil has launched hundreds of suborbital rockets—vehicles that do not place satellites into Earth orbit but instead follow a parabolic trajectory and typically fall into the sea. This time, however, through a private partnership, Brazil will begin placing satellites in orbit using genuine satellite launch vehicle technology, considered a crucial step toward national autonomy and sovereignty.

Rewriting the History of Alcântara

The event also offers an opportunity to rewrite the history of the Alcântara base, marked by the tragic 2003 explosion of the VLS-1 V03, a prototype rocket developed by Brazil’s space program. The accidental ignition of one of the first-stage engines caused an explosion that killed 21 engineers and technicians, the most serious disaster in Brazil’s space history.

Strategic Importance of the Alcântara Launch Center

The December launch of the HANBIT-Nano rocket is part of the Spaceward 2025 mission, conducted by the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) in collaboration with the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB). Experts point out that Brazil—through the Brazilian commercial orbital launch initiative—will finally enter the international market for satellite launches and space experiments.

Alcântara is one of the most strategic launch centers in the world due to its proximity to the equator, providing a 20–30% energy gain compared to locations such as Cape Canaveral or Kourou. Its coastal location ensures safe eastward launches over the Atlantic Ocean, with no population centers beneath the flight path.

China’s Expanding Presence in Brazil’s Space Domain

China has expressed interest in launching future CBERS satellites from Alcântara, including CBERS-6 (2028) and CBERS-5 (2030). Beijing has even suggested providing Brazil with Chengdu J-10C fighter jets in exchange for access to the base. However, this proposal has raised concerns about China’s growing strategic foothold, particularly considering its detailed mapping of Brazil’s natural resources through the CBERS program.

China’s involvement also extends to the BINGO telescope in Paraíba, where participation by CETC—a Chinese state-owned conglomerate linked to dual-use military technologies—has raised international security concerns.

Years of Underinvestment and Signs of Recovery

A 2023 report from the Brazilian National Confederation of Industry (CNI) revealed Brazil ranks second-to-last in space-sector investment among G20 nations, spending only $47 million (0.002% of GDP). Yet signs of recovery are emerging. The Nova Indústria Brasil (NIB) program plans significant investments in aerospace sovereignty through 2033, while FINEP has launched nearly 1 billion reais in calls for new launchers, satellites, and dual-use technologies.

Researchers emphasize that Brazil could replicate the success of its aeronautical cluster in São José dos Campos by creating a technological hub around Alcântara.

New National Rocket Projects

Brazil is developing several cutting-edge projects, including the Brazilian Microlauncher (MLBR), the VLM-AT (Microsatellite Launch Vehicle with Technological Autonomy), and the RATO-14X auxiliary rocket for the hypersonic 14X vehicle. These initiatives are linked to growing global demand for space-based services essential to agriculture, climate monitoring, and environmental preservation.

Brazil’s Rise in Space Agriculture Research

One of Brazil’s most innovative fields is space agriculture. In 2023, Embrapa began collaborating with the AEB and NASA under the Artemis program. On April 14, 2025, Blue Origin’s New Shepard capsule conducted a suborbital flight with Brazilian seeds—including sweet potatoes and chickpeas—to study how microgravity affects plant development.

The research aims to develop more compact, drought-resistant crop varieties adaptable to climate change on Earth and in future lunar or Martian settlements.

National Defense and Space Security Strategies

In October, Brazil’s Ministry of Defense released the second edition of the Strategic Space Systems Program (PESE), which outlines its goals for autonomous access to space, development of critical technologies, and integrated civilian–military cooperation. The document acknowledges the rising threat of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and the growing risk of a space arms race.

The Challenge of Space Debris and the Need for Regional Cooperation

Space debris remains a major threat to space operations. Brazil and other Latin American countries lack robust ground-based sensors for tracking orbital objects, though Brazil’s geographic position makes it ideal for hosting a diversified sensor network that would improve global space-situational awareness.

A Historic Turning Point

As the Spaceward Mission 2025 approaches, the Brazilian commercial orbital launch represents not only a technological milestone but also a strategic turning point. By leveraging its geographic advantages, scientific expertise, and renewed public investment, Brazil aims to strengthen its role in global space governance and innovation.

Ultimately, the success of the country’s first Brazilian commercial orbital launch marks the beginning of a new era—one that could reshape Latin America’s presence in space and contribute to solutions benefiting all humanity.

President José Raúl Mulino said that the achievements of his administration in a year of reorganizing the public finances, of attending to the needs of the population, and of facing the major structural problems that the country has, in particular, the critical situation of the Social Security Fund (CSS), are a reality.

This, according to Mulino, is a way of managing the economy responsibly, transparently, and in a stable manner, institutionally and fiscally in the long term.

Panama Maintains Investment-Grade Rating, Buys Time to Solve the CSS

Panama’s economy will continue to grow at more than double the regional average, the fiscal deficit will close at 4%, and international financial institutions and major credit rating agencies confirm that Panama maintains investment-grade rating. These were some of the messages President José Raúl Mulino sent yesterday in his first conference of the year to the media.

Mulino said that his administration has succeeded in reducing the fiscal deficit, rebuilding investor confidence, and creating the conditions for an economic expansion in which growth rates exceed expectations. This has been made possible by following an economic policy focused on fiscal order, maintaining strong public investment and consistency, which is why Panama maintains investment-grade rating.

“The fiscal deficit is being reduced, we are restoring confidence among investors and the Panama Canal Investment Fund, and we are creating conditions for an economic expansion where growth rates are going to exceed expectations. Panama maintains investment-grade rating because it is executing a disciplined, prudent, and consistent economic policy with fiscal order, while maintaining a strong public investment and consistency,” he explained.

Mulino noted that his government, “thanks to the joint work of my team, is laying solid foundations for an economy that is beginning to gain momentum. We are doing this with seriousness, without falling into cheap populism so that the Panamanian people do not once again pay the consequences of the irresponsible decisions of some governments.”

He added that fiscal prudence is the only responsible way to protect vulnerable sectors of the population and allow the country to remain competitive in the global economy.

Panama will Close the Year Meeting its Fiscal Deficit Target of 4%

Panama will end 2025 with a fiscal deficit of 4%, announced President José Raúl Mulino. This, he said, is an achievement since the deficit for the same period of the previous year closed at 7.5%. This represents a reduction of 3.5 percentage points of GDP, and indicates progress in the reorganization of public finances.

“It has been challenging for us to lower the deficit by three and a half points; it seems simple, but to manage the State to achieve it made this year the most difficult for me in all of my life,” he admitted.

To achieve this correction, Mulino said, “we have had to restrict expenditures, improve our tax collection system, modernize our State, and make decisions on essential investments. We have taken actions to make the State more efficient, to avoid duplication of efforts, and to strengthen internal control.”

Panama: Fiscal Responsibility Law Limits Fiscal Deficit to 4% in 2025

Panama’s Fiscal Responsibility Law limits the fiscal deficit for 2025 to 4.0%. The law, number 445 of 28 October 2024, amends law 34 of 2008 “On Fiscal Responsibility” and law 38 of 2012 “On the regulation and operation of the Panama Savings Fund”.

In addition to setting a deficit ceiling for 2025, Law 445 also establishes a downward path until 2030, when the deficit should not exceed 1.5% of nominal GDP. In this regard, the law establishes the following schedule: 4.0% for 2025, 3.5% for 2026, 3.0% for 2027, 2.5% for 2028, 2.0% for 2029, and 1.5% for 2030.

The legal limits imposed on fiscal policy are in addition to the political guidelines that the government has maintained. The minister of the presidency, Nardy Sosa, stated in October 2023: “From this government, we have said that we must reduce the deficit, and we have defined 4% as a reference figure for the years 2024-2025.”

Panama: Confidence of Investors Returns

Mulino also stated that with a more disciplined fiscal management, the confidence of investors, essential for attracting foreign capital and economic stability, has returned.

As an example of this, he said, Panama maintains investment-grade rating assigned by the three major credit rating agencies, which contradicts previous expectations that they could downgrade the country.

Moody’s Ratings agency confirmed Panama maintains investment-grade rating with a negative outlook on 13 November 2025. On 19 November, just a few days later, the agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) also announced that it had decided to maintain Panama’s investment-grade BBB- rating with a stable outlook.

In its report, S&P stated that “Panama’s rating benefits from its policy consistency during 2024–2025 as well as its solid resilience amid past economic shocks. Over the coming years, we expect resilience to remain strong, despite an abrupt cooling in economic growth in the near term.”

Mulino said: “These are decisions that show us that we are moving in the right direction. According to the International Monetary Fund, Panama will grow at more than twice the average rate in the Americas. And beyond reaching macroeconomic parameters, the government’s priority is to improve the quality of life of our citizens.”

Panama Maintains Investment-Grade Rating amid Optimistic Economic Growth Outlook

The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and ECLAC project real GDP growth of 4.0%, 3.9% and 4.2% for 2025, respectively. This is well above the expected growth for Latin America and the Caribbean of 2.4% in 2025 and 2.3% in 2026.

It should be noted that Panama maintains investment-grade rating amid a dynamic economic outlook driven by the logistics hub, financial services, aviation, the Panama Canal, and Trade. This is one of the reasons, as Panama maintains investment-grade rating, that it scores positively in global financial institutions’ evaluations.

Social Security Fund (CSS) and Health System Integration

President Mulino also urged the CSS and the Ministry of Health (MINSA) to accelerate the long-awaited process of the integration of their respective health systems, which, he said, must be completed by 2026.

He also announced that 2026 will be a major investment year in which thousands of new jobs will be created. He announced that the General State Budget has earmarked US$11.2 billion for public investment that will be directed to infrastructure development, water and sanitation systems, educational facilities, healthcare centers, and other priority projects.

“Those investments are already beginning to create new job opportunities for us. We are betting on the private sector, we are promoting foreign investment, and we are working hard to attract investment capital for the mega projects that the Panama Canal Authority has,” he said.

Opportunities for the Future

Mulino called on the public to be optimistic and not to listen to demagogic criticism without basis and at times, very hypocritical, of those who, he said, want the country to go backwards so that he, Mulino, can fail as president.

“I want to tell you the following. Forget the doomsayers, forget the unnecessary –and sometimes very hypocritical- criticism of those who want the country to fail so that I can fail. The country will not fail, I will not fail as president of all Panamanians,” he said.

Mulino emphasized that the jobs of the future will be technical jobs and those related to logistics. These are professions that are increasingly valued in Panama and are also well paid.

The Dominican Republic has been working in recent years to position itself as a strategic nearshoring hub for U.S. businesses as a result of stable tariffs, steady investment, and record-breaking economic growth. Víctor “Ito” Bisonó, Minister of Industry, Commerce, and MSMEs (MICM), highlighted the importance of these trends on national media platforms, while also noting that this trajectory will only increase over the coming years in tandem with the country’s onshoring opportunities in rare earth minerals and high-tech manufacturing.

A Strategic Partner with a Competitive Advantage for the United States

The Dominican Republic is already recognized by Minister Bisonó as one of the most attractive trade partners of the United States, thanks to a wide range of logistical, geographical, and labor market advantages that put Washington at a competitive advantage. Bilateral trade is heavily tilted in Washington’s favor, with an estimated annual surplus of USD 6 billion that is underpinned by reduced transportation costs and times for companies based in the U.S. taking advantage of short flight times, geographic proximity, and a modern logistics network.

The diversification and relocation of manufacturing and supply chain operations from far-flung markets in Asia and elsewhere is a strategic priority for the United States, and the Dominican Republic is seen as a perfect nearshoring hub for the U.S. in this regard, as Minister Bisonó notes. Central to this status is the local free zone system, workforce readiness and language capabilities, and the presence of certified compliance with U.S. standards and regulations. Nearshoring advantages for the U.S. include traditional exports such as medical devices and pharmaceuticals, electronic manufacturing and assembly, and textiles and apparel, as well as emerging segments in microelectronics, clean tech, and even quantum-enabled technologies.

Security Cooperation to Reduce Drug Trafficking and Illegal Migration

The Dominican Republic is also a key security partner of the U.S. in the fight against drug trafficking. Minister Bisonó noted that Dominican authorities managed to seize 45 tons of cocaine last year, an accomplishment that stands out in the country’s history of security operations. The interdiction of cocaine in the Caribbean on the route to U.S. markets continues to be a priority for the United States, and the cooperation between both countries is improving year over year. This cooperation adds to the predictability of the Dominican Republic as a supplier base of operations for U.S. investors.

As for other strategic interests, such as illegal migration, the Dominican Republic remains a friendly partner of the United States in the effort to avoid irregular and undocumented flows of workers to American territory. The Minister insisted that the Dominican Republic is not a country of origin for illegal migration, another area of agreement between the two countries.

Interest in the Dominican Republic as a strategic nearshoring hub is increasing, as Bisonó underscored in the context of high-level U.S. visits that have taken place in recent months. On the one hand, Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to the Dominican Republic in June for his first official visit to the country as head of the State Department, during which he made clear the strategic role of the Dominican Republic in rare earth minerals, quantum-enabled technologies, and the semiconductor supply chain. He stated, for example, that in next-generation industries the Dominican Republic would be the “ideal partner” for the United States.

For U.S. policy circles, the diversification of the supply of raw materials and the decoupling of industries from geographically and politically sensitive suppliers is one of the strategic levers on the political agenda. In this new global reconfiguration of production and supply chains, the Dominican Republic has also been clearly highlighted in recent days with the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, which took place in the context of tensions with the U.S. military’s intervention to prevent drug shipments in the Caribbean.

War on Drugs at the Center of U.S.-Dominican Cooperation

Bisonó underscored the Dominican Republic’s existing and broad cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense, which he expects Secretary Hegseth to publicly reiterate after his visit. Hegseth’s visit takes place while President Donald Trump has ordered the U.S. military to engage in a full-on offensive against drug smuggling “narco-boats” in Caribbean waters, given their importance in feeding demand in U.S. markets.

Free Zones for Export Growth and U.S. Corporate Interest

Free zones and the strong export record of these free zones as a nearshoring hub in sectors as diverse as industrial machinery, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and cosmetics are among the pillars of economic growth that Bisonó has also recognized. Free zones represent 67% of total exports in the Dominican Republic, providing U.S. companies seeking to expand or enter the local market with a mature and reliable platform to operate in the Dominican Republic, as well as within the context of regional integration and the operation of supply chains that cover the entire Caribbean Basin and South America.

In addition, the MICM Minister also reported historic highs in foreign direct investment last year at USD 4.8 billion and expects these levels to be broken again with estimates of more than USD 5 billion in 2025. The main sectors attracting new investments in the Dominican Republic nearshoring hub have been logistics, manufacturing, renewable energy, telecommunications, and high-value services.