Growing Chinese Economic Presence in the Region
Direct investment from the Asian country in Latin America reached 14.71 billion dollars in 2024. This figure reflects not only the magnitude of capital flows but also the consolidation of a long-term strategy that combines trade, infrastructure, technology, and energy. China has established itself as a commercial partner for multiple Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, and has expanded its presence with emblematic projects like the Port of Chancay in Peru — an expansion that has generated new frictions with the United States and reshaped parts of the region’s geopolitical balance. For many analysts, Chinese investment in Latin America has become a structural component of the continent’s economic landscape.
Strategic Infrastructure and Supply Chains
That port, inaugurated last year to connect South America directly with China, joins other initiatives such as automobile factories in Mexico and Brazil, copper and iron mines in Chile, railway projects in Argentina, and lithium operations in the triangle formed by that country, Bolivia, and Chile. These investments do not merely seek natural resources; they aim to create logistical hubs that reduce costs, bring markets closer together, and increase the competitiveness of regional exports.
According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, direct investment from the Asian country in Latin America reached 14.71 billion dollars in 2024. Data from the National Autonomous University of Mexico show that, between 2010 and 2019, this inflow of capital exceeded that of the previous decade. However, since the pandemic, the pace has slowed due to global uncertainty, logistical restrictions, and adjustments in Beijing’s priorities.
Long-Term Interest and Growth Expectations
As early as 2011, Jin Liqun — then president of China Investment Corporation, a sovereign wealth fund with about 1.57 trillion yuan in assets and tasked with investing abroad — expressed his “optimism” about growth in Latin America and announced that investments in the region would “increase,” pointing specifically to opportunities in countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Those remarks anticipated a trend that today spans sectors as diverse as energy, telecommunications, agriculture, and finance.
However, what was initially perceived as a search for new markets and profitable investments is now viewed in Washington as a “strategic threat,” according to William Jackson, chief emerging-markets economist at the British consultancy Capital Economics. In his analysis, Chinese investment in Latin America has implications that go beyond trade, introducing new dependencies, political alignments, and negotiating room for Latin American governments vis-à-vis the United States.
Geopolitical Competition and the Shadow of the Monroe Doctrine
In a report published this year, Jackson argues that the region could become the stage for a revival — this time with China as the main actor — of the Monroe Doctrine, through which the United States sought to limit European influence in the Americas during the 19th century. The difference today is that Latin American countries, to a greater extent, seek to diversify their partners in order to secure better terms, attract technology, and reduce vulnerabilities, even if that increases competition among great powers.
A New Roadmap for the Future
This month, Beijing released a new official roadmap for Latin America and the Caribbean — its third since 2008 — stating that China and the region share “broad development prospects.” More specifically, Chinese authorities see opportunities in artificial intelligence, telecommunications, renewable energy, hydrogen, mining, and mineral processing. They also propose boosting projects in transportation, logistics, housing, electricity, and urban development under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative, which several countries in the region have joined.
The document also mentions tourism initiatives — China has granted visa-free entry to visitors from Argentina, Peru, and Chile — as well as greater use of local currencies in cross-border transactions, together with dialogue among regulators and central banks. Financially, Argentina stands out for its currency-swap agreement with China, which has been crucial in stabilizing reserves and supporting external payments, and was partially renewed this year.
Trade in Transition and Sectoral Effects
Latin America has become a priority market for China’s foreign trade, alongside Southeast Asia and Africa, particularly in a context of tariff tensions with the United States. Through November, while exports to the U.S. fell by 18 percent, those destined for Latin American countries rose by nearly 8 percent, reaching roughly 276 billion dollars — equivalent to 70 percent of what the world’s largest economy buys from the Asian giant.
Over the past two decades, Chinese exports have risen nearly eleven-fold, mainly in manufactured goods and, more recently, electric vehicles in markets such as Brazil. In the opposite direction, Latin America exports primarily iron, copper, soybeans, and oil — reinforcing a pattern in which China imports raw materials and exports higher-value goods. For some governments, this opens opportunities; for others, it raises concerns about a renewed dependence on primary commodities.
Dependencies, Opportunities, and Caution
The countries with the greatest exposure are Chile, Brazil, and Peru, each sending more than 25 percent of its exports to China. Even so, Capital Economics warns against “overstating China’s role”: the region exports three times more to the United States than to China, and even excluding Mexico, the volume shipped to the U.S. remains comparable. Jackson emphasizes that “China does not exercise the hegemony often attributed to it. Especially for Mexico and Central America, the United States remains far more important.”
Nevertheless, Chinese investment in Latin America is introducing new productive capacity in sectors such as automobile manufacturing, clean energy, and digitalization, while also upgrading critical infrastructure. The debate, therefore, centers on how to maximize the benefits — jobs, technology transfer, and logistical integration — while avoiding excessive dependence, environmental harm, or unsustainable debt.
Energy Transition and Critical Minerals
The global push toward renewable energy has heightened Chinese interest in lithium, copper, and nickel. In the so-called Lithium Triangle — Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile — Chinese consortia are participating in projects that could shape the global battery supply chain. A similar dynamic is unfolding in solar and wind energy, where Chinese companies provide competitive financing and technology. In this sphere, Chinese investment in Latin America is seen as an accelerator of the energy transition, though local communities demand greater transparency, participation, and environmental guarantees.
Looking Ahead
Looking forward, Latin American governments are trying to balance relations with Washington and Beijing — attracting capital and technology without compromising strategic autonomy. China’s new roadmap suggests a more sophisticated form of cooperation focused on innovation, services, and sustainability. For observers, Chinese investment in Latin America will be a defining element of that equation, both because of its scale and its ability to shape emerging industries.
Ultimately, the challenge for the region is to turn this wave of capital into inclusive development, high-quality infrastructure, and productive diversification. Achieving that goal will depend on solid regulatory frameworks, transparency, and long-term planning that allows the relationship with China — and with other partners — to translate into tangible, lasting benefits for society.