Between trade, investment, and strategic operations, the commercial relationship between China and Ecuador accounts for between 9% and 10% of the latter country’s GDP. Ecuador is seeking more investment, debt relief, and key agreements with its second-largest trading partner.
Amid global tensions and with a national economy in need of momentum, Ecuador has turned its attention to an increasingly decisive partner: China. This is no minor choice. The direct influence of the Asian giant on Ecuador’s economy already amounts to between 9% and 10% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This scale makes the bilateral relationship a strategic matter, not just a commercial one. China-Ecuador economic relations are therefore central to the country’s broader development strategy.
During his first international trip of his new term, President Daniel Noboa visited China with a clear goal: to secure new investment flows, negotiate possible relief on existing debt, and reaffirm the importance of economic ties with Beijing. “The era of ideology is over,” Noboa declared at the World Economic Forum in Tianjin, making it clear that his administration prioritizes pragmatic alliances over political alignments.
Reality supports this strategy. China is not only Ecuador’s second-largest trading partner, behind the United States, but also its primary source of foreign direct investment (FDI), its top buyer of non-oil products such as shrimp, and a dominant player in strategic sectors like oil, mining, and the automotive industry. China-Ecuador economic relations are increasingly shaping Ecuador’s export dynamics and industrial development.
China: A Partner with Weight in Ecuador’s National Economy
According to data from the Superintendence of Companies and the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE), China accounted for 50% of all FDI entering the country in 2024. On average, Ecuador’s FDI has ranged between $200 million and $800 million in recent years, meaning Chinese contributions hover around $300 million. This figure represents 0.24% of GDP. While this may seem modest in proportion, its impact is amplified by its concentration in key sectors like energy, mining, infrastructure, and automotive manufacturing.
Beyond direct investment, bilateral trade has reached historic levels. In 2024, trade between the two countries surpassed $10 billion (imports and exports combined), accounting for approximately 8% of Ecuador’s GDP. Although Ecuador maintains a trade deficit—importing more from China than it exports—the Chinese market has been vital for products like shrimp, with more than 50% of Ecuador’s shrimp exports destined for China. This trade dynamic underscores the growing relevance of China-Ecuador economic relations to Ecuador’s fiscal and trade health.
Oil, Mining, and Automobiles: China’s Muscle in Key Sectors
China’s footprint is not limited to capital flows. Its involvement in strategic sectors is pivotal. In oil, companies such as PetroOriental and Andes Petroleum (subsidiaries of CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC) control productive blocks in the Amazon region and have generated over $2 billion in cumulative investments. It is estimated that together they produce around 20% of Ecuador’s crude oil.
In mining, Ecuacorriente S.A. (ECSA) operates Mirador, the largest open-pit copper mine in Ecuador. Meanwhile, Explorcobres S.A. (EXSA) holds rights over the San Carlos-Panantza project. In recent months, Chinese companies have also acquired stakes in additional mining projects such as Cascabel and others across the country.
In the automotive sector, the Chinese brand BYD has expressed interest in assembling electric vehicles in Ecuador, promoting the country’s energy transition. Additionally, automakers such as Chery, JAC, Geely, and Dongfeng accounted for more than 45% of new car sales in Ecuador during the first half of 2025, according to the Ecuadorian Association of Automotive Companies (AEADE).
Although it is not possible to precisely quantify the value of these operations within GDP without net revenue data, it is estimated that economic activity generated by Chinese companies could exceed $2 billion, roughly 1.6% of GDP. These developments further illustrate how China-Ecuador economic relations extend beyond simple trade, influencing long-term industrial capability and innovation.
Ecuador and China: A Free Trade Agreement in Full Effect
The strengthening of this relationship was solidified with the signing of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China on May 10, 2023, which was ratified by the National Assembly and has been in force since January 2024. This agreement eliminates tariffs on 90% of Ecuador’s exportable goods, benefiting sectors such as shrimp, bananas, coffee, cocoa, and timber.
Meanwhile, Ecuador remains the only Pacific coast country in the Americas without an FTA with the United States, despite the U.S. being its top destination for oil and agricultural exports. This has allowed China to gain ground as a structured commercial alternative, further deepening China-Ecuador economic relations through institutional frameworks.
Debt with China: The Financial Side of the Relationship
Between 2010 and 2017, China provided over $30 billion in loans to Ecuador through entities such as the China Development Bank. While Ecuador’s exposure to Chinese debt has declined in recent years, now accounting for less than 5% of external debt, the Noboa administration is seeking to refinance and reactivate credit lines as a way to reduce its reliance on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and improve the country’s risk profile.
As previously reported by La Hora, Ecuador’s current debt to China exceeds $2.4 billion, with more than $1.6 billion due to mature by 2027. “Postponing these payments could provide fiscal space for the Noboa government to pay other debts and increase public investment,” noted economist Andrés Rodríguez.
More Trade and Investment with China—but with Transparency
The relationship with China has not been without controversy. The Coca Codo Sinclair megaproject, financed and built by Sinohydro, has suffered structural failures and is embroiled in legal disputes. Likewise, the ECU-911 video surveillance system, also of Chinese origin, has been criticized for technological vulnerabilities and privacy concerns, as noted by Sebastián Hurtado, president and founder of Prófitas.
Additional tensions include temporary suspensions of shrimp exports and the presence of Chinese fishing fleets near the Galápagos Islands, often seen as diplomatic pressure tactics.
Therefore, rather than resisting China’s presence, Hurtado emphasized, the challenge lies in channeling it with transparency, strategic vision, and sovereignty, demanding higher standards in contracts and diversifying partners in critical sectors. This will ensure that China-Ecuador economic relations evolve in a way that aligns with Ecuador’s long-term development goals.
Conclusion
The China-Ecuador economic relationship has become a cornerstone of Ecuador’s broader development strategy, touching nearly every key sector of the economy, from natural resources and manufacturing to trade and infrastructure. While the partnership offers immense opportunity, it also calls for improved regulatory frameworks, enhanced transparency, and a commitment to national interests. If managed prudently, China-Ecuador economic relations can help stabilize the economy, attract quality investment, and reduce fiscal vulnerabilities, all while expanding Ecuador’s global economic footprint.