Uruguay has begun its accession to the CPTPP as part of a broader effort to diversify market access. This early stage of Uruguayan CPTPP accession comes as the country moves toward a possible end-of-2025 conclusion of the Mercosur–European Union agreement. At the same time, it evaluates the impact of the commercial pact between Milei and Trump on a tense Mercosur.
Suppose on December 20, the agreement between Mercosur and the European Union is finally signed. In that case, the end of 2025 will be excellent for Uruguay and its ambition to secure better market-access conditions for its products beyond the region. Recent news prompted widespread celebration: the acceptance to begin the country’s accession process to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a milestone now widely referred to as Uruguayan CPTPP accession.
The announcement was first made on the social network X by the Uruguayan foreign minister, Mario Lubetkin, and on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official account. Later this morning, the minister spoke at a press conference and described this step as the achievement of a “state policy” that brings Uruguay closer to a “very important club of countries.” On the part of the CPTPP members, the communication was made public by Australia’s Ministry of Trade and Tourism: “We have decided to begin the accession process with Uruguay and, if approved, we will proceed with the other countries in 2026. This reflects the great interest in joining this high-level agreement and our ambition to expand its membership.”
The 12 current members of the CPTPP are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. These economies account for around 15% of global GDP and a similar share of international trade, with a combined population of nearly 600 million.
Uruguay’s proposal to join this framework was submitted three years ago, in November 2022, by the center-right government led by Luis Lacalle Pou. The efforts continued under the current center-left Broad Front coalition government, inaugurated in March and headed by Yamandú Orsi. Political leaders and analysts have described Uruguayan CPTPP accession as a turning point in the nation’s trade strategy.
Celebrations
“National policies. Uruguay in the world. That is how we proceeded. Not always with the desired results (…). Good news that the government has taken another step,” former president Lacalle Pou wrote on X.
Omar Paganini, foreign minister during the final stage of the previous government, also celebrated the news, highlighting the work carried out by both administrations. He congratulated the officials involved, including the current foreign minister. “Excellent news! A clear example of how state policies work when there is real commitment!” said Facundo Márquez, vice president of the Uruguayan Exporters’ Union and a businessman in the caviar industry. “What great joy. Another match now begins, one that must be played calmly and steadily. Expectations shifted today, and that’s good for everyone, in Uruguay and the region,” noted Marcel Vaillant, an international trade expert.
For international relations analyst Ignacio Bartesaghi, joining the CPTPP is “a step of enormous importance for Uruguay, which is beginning a negotiation process that will certainly not be easy, but could lead to a qualitative and quantitative leap in the country’s trade openness. Mercosur is becoming more flexible along the way, which is very welcome.” According to Bartesaghi, Uruguayan CPTPP accession strengthens Uruguay’s hand in arguing for greater autonomy within the bloc.
A 2024 study funded by the local think tank Pharos estimated the effects on trade, investment, and per capita income of Uruguay’s potential accession to the CPTPP. Summarizing the results, the “central variable” is the change in welfare, measured as a proportional increase in consumption. For Uruguay, the welfare effect of remaining outside the CPTPP would be adverse but minimal (-0.01%). By contrast, joining the agreement would yield short-term gains of 1.2% and long-term gains of 2.3%, percentages that would increase if China were to enter the treaty.
Argentina and its agreement with Trump
For Uruguay—which produces far more beef, rice, soybeans, and dairy products than its 3.5 million inhabitants can consume—economic growth depends on external markets; it must export. For Uruguayans, Mercosur offered the chance to enter the large Argentine and Brazilian markets under advantageous conditions and also the hope that, as a bloc, it could negotiate trade agreements with third countries or economic groupings. In practice, this failed to meet expectations and even left people frustrated.
For this reason, recent governments—some more firmly than others—have demanded flexibility to negotiate trade deals independently, outside the constraints of the bloc’s “4 plus 1” structure. But that proposal has not received support from the bloc’s main partners.
Now, the commercial agreement announced between Argentina and the United States has placed the Uruguayan authorities on guard. Is it a risk or an opportunity? “It puts us in a position to stay alert, which is an advantage; perhaps you can get on board as well,” the Uruguayan president said a few days ago. He added that “Uruguay is in a position to take advantage. One of two things: either you get hurt if you put on blinders, don’t open your mind and don’t get into the game, whichever side it is,” he said. “Today you cannot shut yourself off; on the contrary, in a world that is closing, you must open up,” he insisted.
The president said he intends to speak directly with his Argentine counterpart, Javier Milei, to assess the agreement’s impact. “Maybe one-on-one it’s easier,” he said. Although some criticize him and even mock his sometimes ambiguous answers, Orsi may have reasons not to be more forceful in this case.
In fact, there are doubts regarding the Argentina–United States agreement—even among experts within his own government. Among other reasons, this is because information is still lacking. “To make an assessment, we first need to know the details contained in the agreement, particularly regarding tariffs,” said Deputy Foreign Minister Valeria Csukasi in the Montevideo newspaper El País. “We have always said that we understand Argentina’s situation and the need to negotiate this agreement, and from that standpoint, we do not judge it,” she added.
The official commented—echoing Uruguay’s longstanding call for flexibility—that when the bloc negotiates together, “it is a force of nature.” Still, when it does not, Uruguay must “seek other alternatives” and find strategies to meet the needs of actors in foreign trade.
A ‘tense’ Mercosur?
At Uruguay’s Ministry of Economy, there was concern that the growing closeness between Milei and U.S. President Donald Trump could shift from symbolic gestures to concrete trade policy. In fact, the delegation that attended the recent IMF assembly in Washington, D.C., led by Minister Gabriel Oddone, was told by U.S. sources that an agreement with Argentina was imminent. A few days later, this was confirmed through the official announcement.
Oddone expressed his unease two weeks ago during an event for Spanish investors with interests in Uruguay. “We are close to a scenario in which next year we could see an even greater rapprochement between Argentina and the United States in trade matters,” he said, adding that such an agreement would be a “watershed moment” if Brazil were left out. In that scenario, Mercosur could become “strained,” the minister speculated.
A concern within the Ministry of Economy is that, for example, beef—a product that consistently ranks at the top of Uruguay’s export basket—could be placed at a disadvantage relative to Argentine beef in accessing the U.S. market.
While, like most government officials, Uruguayan business leaders want to see more details before stating how to respond to the Milei–Trump agreement, some analysts have already taken a clear position. Bartesaghi, director of the Institute of International Business at the Catholic University of Uruguay, wrote on X: “We ALL should have the same flexibility within the bloc and, once and for all, accept that members must be allowed to negotiate bilateral agreements with any country without needing consensus among partners.”